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Preface
On 18 June 1999 a symposium was held at the Suntory Centre at which there
were two speakers. One was Professor Richard J Smethurst, of the History
Department, University of Pittsburgh, who was at the time visiting Clare Hall,
Cambridge. Professor Smethurst has written widely on aspects of pre-World
War II Japanese history, including two major monographs, A Social History of
Prewar Japanese Militarism (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA,
1974) and Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 1870-
1940 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986). He is currently
working on a biography of Takahashi Korekiyo. The second speaker was
Professor Masataka Matsuura of the Law Faculty at Hokkaido University,
currently academic visitor in the International History Department at LSE.
Professor Matsuura is the author of Nitch  Sens  ki ni okeru Keizai to Seiji
(Economics and Politics during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945) (Tokyo
University Press, 1995). We are grateful to both authors for allowing us to
reproduce their papers here.
Janet Hunter
February 2000
Abstracts
The paper by Richard J Smethurst discusses the influences that led to the
economic policies pursued in the interwar period by Takahashi Korekiyo, who
engineered Japan’s recovery from the depression in the early 1930s, and is
often thought of as the ‘Keynes’ of Japan. The paper traces the influence on
Takahashi’s thinking of his Western experiences and diverse bureaucratic
career, but focusses in particular on the role of Takahashi’s mentor, Maeda
Masana.
The paper by Masataka Matsuura analyses the term zaikai as used in prewar
Japan and its identity as a small network whose influence was distinct from
that of the zaibatsu. The paper traces the membership and activities of this
small group from the time of Shibusawa Eiichi through to the Second World
War, and argues for the importance of the functions they discharged in the
context of the developing Japanese economy.
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1Takahashi Korekiyo’s Economic Policies
in the Great Depression and Their Meiji Roots
Richard J Smethurst
Takahashi Korekiyo was one of Japan’s greatest financial statesmen
because as an economic thinker he was ahead of his times - in Japan,
and worldwide as well. Takahashi, alone among Japanese financial
leaders, understood well before he became finance minister in
December 1931 during the depression, five  important economic
principles, which in combination were not  held, as far as I know, by any
other Japanese governmental financial leader before the post-World
War II Keynesian revolution. These principles were: governments, by
devaluing their currencies and deficit financing, can use monetary and
fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth in times of recession;
governments, by upwardly valuing their currencies and balancing or
running a surplus in their current account budgets, can use monetary
and fiscal policy to contract demand and fight inflation when economies
overheat; market information is the key to economic growth; economic
development should raise the standards of living of a nation’s populace
and not just make the state wealthy and powerful; and excessive military
spending endangers the nation’s economic health.
The primary purpose of this essay is to investigate how Takahashi
learned this set of ideas long  before they became commonplace. To be
sure Takahashi spoke, read, and wrote English fluently and had a wide
range of foreign acquaintances. But I shall argue that the primary
2influences on his thinking were his own experiences in his fifty year
bureaucratic career before the end of World War I, and in particular his
associations with another official, Maeda Masana, who also figures
prominently in this essay. Maeda understood intuitively in the 1880s not
only the crucial importance of markets in disseminating information, but
also the importance of insuring that ‘rich country’ (fukoku) meant rich
people and that ‘strong army’ (ky hei) did not get out of hand.
Takahashi served as prime minister, governor of the Bank of Japan,
minister of agriculture and commerce, and between 1913 and 1936,
seven times as minister of finance. Born in 1854, the year after
Commodore Perry's black ships visited Japan, Takahashi played  a
crucial role in some of the central events of the Meiji, Taish , and early
Sh wa periods. In his teens, he interpreted for David Murray, the
American educational advisor to the new Meiji government. In his
twenties, he translated important English-language books on public
health and economics. In his thirties, he wrote Japan's first and second
sets of copyright and patent laws and oversaw the construction of the
beautiful Bank of Japan building, where much of the research for this
essay was done. In his forties and fifties, he became vice governor of
the Bank of Japan, sold treasury bonds in the City of London to pay for
the Russo-Japanese War, became president of the Yokohama Specie
Bank, Japan's official import-export bank, governor of the Bank of
Japan, and then in 1913, finance minister for the first time. In his sixties
after the end of World War I, he helped bring  parliamentary government
to fruition during the Hara Cabinet and afterward, and as prime minister
3in 1921-22, helped create a basis for stable relations with Britain and
America through the Washington Treaty system. In his early seventies,
he headed the Finance Ministry for six weeks to solve the Financial
Crisis of 1927, and in his late seventies, he served as finance minister in
three successive cabinets and engineered Japan’s recovery from the
World Depression.
It is for the last of these tasks that Takahashi, who is often called
‘Japan's Keynes’, is best known.1 In the months after Takahashi became
finance minister for the fifth time in December 1931, he followed the first
of his five principles, that is, the Keynesian one, by introducing
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies that primed the pump for
economic expansion. In the monetary realm, Takahashi took Japan off
the gold standard, ended the convertibility of paper money for gold, let
the exchange rate float, lowered interest rates, and introduced
legislation to raise the limit on the Bank of Japan's issuance of bank
notes by over eight times. The concomitant drop in the value of the yen
led to a boom in Japanese exports even while the rest of the world's
trade contracted. In fact, the mid-1930s was one of the few times in the
pre-war modern era when Japan had  a favorable trade balance. In the
summer of 1932, Takahashi also introduced a countercyclical fiscal
policy. He increased government spending and made up the difference
not by raising taxes, but by deficit financing - and deficit financing
through selling low-interest government bonds directly to the Bank of
Japan rather than on the open market. He thus avoided the potential
problem of ‘crowding out’. The government's spending increased money
4in circulation and stimulated demand. Growing domestic demand
together with expanding exports encouraged production and re-
employment - more people had more money to spend - and Japan
began to recover from the depression. Japan had a growth rate of 5.8
per cent per year from 1930 to 1938.
And Takahashi clearly understood the theory behind a spending policy
during a severe recession, as the following quote from an article he
wrote in November 1929 while his deflationist predecessor as finance
minister, Inoue Junnosuke, was still in office, shows:
‘If someone goes to a geisha house and calls a geisha, eats
luxurious food, and spends 2,000 yen, we disapprove morally.  But
if we analyze how that money is used, we find that the part that
paid for food helps support the chef's salary, and is used to pay for
fish, meat, vegetables, and seasoning, or the costs of transporting
it. The farmers, fishermen, and merchants who receive the money
then buy clothes, food, and shelter. And the geisha uses the
money she receives to buy food, clothes, cosmetics, and to pay
taxes. If this hypothetical man does not go to a geisha house and
saves his 2,000 yen, bank deposits will grow, but the efficacy of
his money will be lessened.
But he goes to a geisha house and his money is transferred to the
hands of farmers, artisans, and fishermen. It goes in turn to
various other producers and works twenty or thirty times over.
From the individual's point of view, it would be good to save his
2,000 yen, but when seen from the vantage point of the national
economy, because the money works twenty or thirty times over,
spending is better.’2
In the final chapter of his life, in 1934-35, when Japan's economy
expanded and neared full employment because of his stimulative efforts,
inflation threatened; thus, Takahashi followed another of the five
5principles: he attempted to introduce tight-money, balanced-budget
policies. Takahashi, ever the flexible pragmatist, decided to reduce
spending by making cuts in allocations to those areas which had
expanded most rapidly in 1932-34, rural relief and the military. He
managed to eliminate relief spending, but in spite of several highly
publicized acrimonious debates with the army and navy ministers,
debates that cost him his life during the February 26, 1936 coup d’état
attempt, Takahashi could not do more than prevent the military budget
from growing further in 1934-36.3
But as I stated above, my primary interest in studying Takahashi  is in
his education. How did the illegitimate child of a Kan  School fusuma
painter in the bakufu’s employ and a family maid become a
sophisticated finance minister many years later? Takahashi in his
autobiography does not mention going to school as a young child , even
to a terakoya. At age ten, he was sent to Yokohama to study English
with the wife of an American missionary, at age twelve he worked as an
errand boy in Yokohama for the Scots banker A.A. Shand, at age
thirteen he began a year-and-one-half stay in San Francisco where he
unwittingly signed a contract for seven years service as a house boy,
and at age fourteen he returned to Japan to teach English in a  
government school, the first step in a sixty-seven year official career. 4
Takahashi developed his knowledge of politics, societies, economics
and finance in a number of ways. He read English all of his adult life and
was familiar with the works of important Western writers on these
6subjects. For example, in his twenties he helped translate Alfred
Marshall’s The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade, and the famous postwar
economist uchi Hy e has remarked on a photograph, taken in the last
few months of Takahashi’s life, that shows the octogenarian sitting in his
garden reading Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s book, Soviet Communism:
A New Civilization?5  He had knowledgeable Japanese acquaintances,
many of whom were or had been his subordinates, who spoke to him
from time to time on political and economic matters. Men like Fukai
Eigo, by 1935 governor of the Bank of Japan, and Tsushima Juichi,
deputy minister of the Finance Ministry at the time of Takahashi’s
assassination in 1936, and economic journalists like Ishibashi Tanzan, a
translator and advocate of Keynes’ work, fit into this category.
Takahashi, both in Japan and on long trips abroad in 1886, 1898, and
1904-7, built a network of British and American friends, men like Shand
and the Jewish German-American financier, Jacob Schiff, to mention
only two, and he carried on an active correspondence with them about
subjects such as economic conditions in Japan and the West. The
Takahashi papers in the National Diet Library in Tokyo contain letters in
English to and from fifty different non-Japanese, including Schiff, his son
Mortimer, Shand, J. W. Robertson-Scott, Nicholas Murray Butler, Ernest
Cassel, Lord Revelstoke, Edmond de Rothschild, Herbert Croly and
Benjamin Strong.6
But, most important, I would argue, the auto-didact Takahashi
developed most of his ideas on the job as a ‘policy apprentice’ in the  
various government agencies in which he served. Unlike most civil
7servants, Takahashi did not have a long career in only one part  of the
bureaucracy, but developed a broad knowledge of government,
economics, and finance (and I might add, a large network of
acquaintances) by moving  from office to office. He was an English
teacher at Daigaku Nank , a forerunner of Tokyo University. He served
as an interpreter in the Education Ministry. He spent almost a decade in
the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry. He was the first director of
Japan’s Patent Bureau. He headed  the Tokyo Agricultural College. He
worked for twenty years in the Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie
Bank - and he did all of this before he became finance minister for the
first time at the age of fifty-eight in 1913, the first year of the Taish  era.
While he served in these various agencies, Takahashi met a number of
influential mentors: Mori Arinori, the Westernizer turned nationalist
education minister, Guido Verbeck, the Dutch-American advisor to early
Meiji leaders, Hara Takashi, the French-speaking diplomat who became
Japan’s first party prime minister, Matsukata Masayoshi, Japan’s
founding  finance minister, and most important, I think, Maeda Masana,
the man who introduced Takahashi to the third, fourth, and fifth of his
principles, that is, the importance of market signals, of spreading the
benefits of economic  growth, and of limiting military spending.
Unlike Takahashi, Maeda had a superb late Tokugawa period
education. Born the son of a Chinese-style doctor from Satsuma domain
in 1850, four years before Takahashi, Maeda at the age of eight began
Dutch and classical Chinese studies (because of the latter, he
developed a prose writing style that is much more difficult to read than
8that of the less well-educated Takahashi), and as a teenager assisted
the officials who oversaw Satsuma’s trade with the Ryukyus, studied
English in Nagasaki, and in 1868 went to Shanghai to help publish a
Japanese-English dictionary. As a samurai from Satsuma, he played  a
minor role in the defeat of the Tokugawa, and not surprisingly, came out
of the Meiji Restoration  as a fervent nationalist, but, unlike many of his
comrades, also as a patriot who believed that Japan needed to learn
everything it could from the Western powers. To participate in that
learning, Maeda went to France in 1869 for eight years.7
Maeda went to France in awe of Western civilization - in fact, during his
early days in Paris, he despaired whether Japan could ever catch up
with the West. However, in his first year in Paris, he witnessed the fall of
the city to the Prussians, and then the Paris Commune. These events
convinced him that while Europe might be better than Japan in
technology and material things, it had no spiritual advantage. He was
liberated from his feeling of the ‘overwhelming superiority’ of Western
culture by the poor morale of the French soldiers in their war against the
Prussians and by the chaos of the following year. In the second half of
his stay, Maeda studied with Eugene Tisserand (1830-1925), a high-
ranking official in the French Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, who
taught the young Japanese the crucial role  of the national government
in helping farmers and entrepreneurs improve their agricultural and
industrial productivity.
9The highly self-confident - actually arrogant - Maeda returned to Japan
in 1877 firmly committed to the centrality of agriculture and traditional
industry in Japan’s economic development. Accordingly, between 1877
and 1884 (it was during this time, in 1881, that Takahashi made his
move from the Ministry of Education to Maeda’s Ministry of Commerce
and Agriculture to study copyright and patent laws), Maeda helped
develop a program for the direct export of these products so that Japan
did not have to use foreign merchants in the treaty ports as middlemen,
set up a branch of the Mitsui Trading Company in Paris, and established
a centre on the grounds of the former Satsuma estate in Mita for testing
and disseminating improved plants, seeds, and farming methods.
Maeda was also one of the architects of the mid-Meiji plan to increase
agricultural productivity by using successful farmers as teachers to
disseminate new farming techniques to less advanced cultivators. He
encouraged farmers and small industrialists to exhibit their products in a
variety of local, national, and international fairs and competitions both to
spread new techniques and to sell products, and was the major mover
behind Japan’s exhibit of 40,000 sericultural and agricultural products,
ceramics, textiles, and furniture at the Paris World’s Fair of 1878. It was
during this period of Maeda’s career, in 1883-4, that Mori Arinori
introduced Takahashi to Maeda.8
Maeda affected Takahashi’s education in a number of ways. Maeda’s
intense nationalism impressed Takahashi. As Takahashi wrote years
later, ‘After two days of talking with Maeda, I realized that my concept of
the state was shallow. The state was not something separate from the
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self. The state and the self were the same thing’.9 Maeda's state-
assisted approach to economic development influenced Takahashi's
commitment to the use of macroeconomic policy to stimulate or slow the
economy. Both men, although strong nationalists, feared army and navy
influence in government and opposed excessive military spending.
Maeda, in his policy proposals, gave highest priority to agriculture and
traditional industry, secondary importance to public and heavy industrial
enterprises, and ranked military and construction spending as least
important. Takahashi, as the dean of historians of Taish  democracy,
Shinobu Seizabur , has written, was committed to the ‘bourgeois’ value
of political party control over the military. Both emphasized
fundamentals, that is, the need for formulating policy initiatives only after
carrying out basic research into existing conditions. Maeda wrote about
‘questioning things,’ and Takahashi bored his listeners all the rest of his
life by his continual incantation of the need to get down to basics. To put
it in his words, ‘I constantly say “fundamentals, fundamentals,” (konpon,
konpon) and during the Hara cabinet years, I was told, “You always say
fundamentals and nation.” This began after I met Maeda in the Ministry
of Agriculture and Commerce. Today, when a problem arises, I do not
look for temporary solutions. We must investigate what caused the
problem. I learned this years ago when we created Maeda's K gy
ikensho’.10 Both men wanted the general populace to share in the
benefits of economic growth. Maeda, as we shall see, harshly criticized
finance minister Matsukata because his deflationary policies in the early
1880s impoverished the countryside; Takahashi wrote during the
depression in the 1930s, ‘Production in the broadest sense means all
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the people are working. It is good when everybody is working and
making an income without wasteful government spending. There is no
other way than full employment’.11 And finally, although both men
believed in development driven by governmental programs, they also
believed that local officials and producers had better information about
the allocation of resources than did bureaucrats in Tokyo. This
influence, their commitment to market information, is one of the points I
want to emphasize today.12
Takahashi had frequent and intense contact with Maeda in 1884-5, the
period in which Maeda researched, edited, and wrote his famous
industrial survey and developmental proposal, Opinions on Promoting
Industry (K gy  iken). In January 1884 Maeda presented to Saig
Tsugumichi, the minister of Agriculture and Commerce, a proposal for
the formulation of an industrial development plan based on a detailed
understanding of current local conditions, that is, fundamentals. Saig
approved, and Maeda and his team of 40-50 men in the Fourth Section
of the ministry worked day and night to turn out by August an eighteen
volume interim report. This effort took place in the midst of finance
minister Matsukata's campaign for frugality in government. He ordered
each ministry to dismiss some of its bureaucrats. Maeda gathered those
in his ministry slated for dismissal into the fourth section, in Japanese
shika, as his K gy  iken team, and had his ministry save money by
eliminating horses and carriages for its members instead. The joke at
the Commerce and Agriculture Ministry at the time was, ‘N sh mush
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uma o haishite, shika o oki,’ ‘the ministry eliminated horses and set up
deer,’ a homonym for fourth section, Maeda's team.13
The interim draft of K gy  iken was a detailed presentation of the actual
conditions of regional industry and agriculture - one which Maeda
planned to update every few years - and a proposal to enrich the
country by stimulating them. Since Maeda's goal was economic
development through emphasis on agriculture and traditional industry,
not through heavy, transplant industry and military power, K gy  iken
included elements subversive to the mainstream views of the most
powerful governmental officials of the day. Maeda believed that one
could not bring about economic development without raising the
standards of living of the average Japanese. He was more interested in
‘enriching the country’ than in ‘building a strong army’ and gave military
spending a low priority. He criticized finance minister Matsukata's
deflationary policies because of their adverse impact on rural society -
as Maeda wrote in K gy  iken, ‘Matsukata's ideas are fundamentally
upside down’. He opposed the government's favoritism to the ‘privileged
class of politico-commercial capitalists’ like the Iwasakis and Mitsuis at
the expense of the countryside. And important for our discussion, he
believed that Japan's industrial development must come from below.
Maeda was committed to industrial development that was generated at
the grass-roots level.14
Maeda's proposal for an industrial bank showed his commitment to local
decision-making most clearly. As Takahashi, Maeda's spokesman
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during the industrial bank debate of 1885, wrote: ‘The Finance Ministry's
proposal called for establishing a central bank first and then local
branches. It wanted to relieve the government of the cost of contributing
800 thousand yen per year for public works by shifting the burden to the
industrial bank. But our ministry's proposal was for setting up local
branches first and the central bank later. Prefectural banks would be set
up only after prefectures had made various preparations such as
establishing agricultural testing stations, agricultural cooperative
associations, circuit teachers, and other organs of agricultural
improvement. When the prefectural bank had raised one million yen
locally (from private sources), the government would contribute a
matching amount. Only when a number of local banks were in operation,
would a central financial organ be set up’.15
Matsukata and the Finance Ministry, with the support of the home
minister, general Yamagata Aritomo, and the army, wanted a centralized
industrial bank to shift off budget expensive public works spending,
much of which was for the military. Maeda, Takahashi and the
Agriculture and Commerce Ministry wanted to create decentralized
banks for rural economic development, to create rural wealth, and
believed that local people, who knew local products, conditions, and
markets better than central bureaucrats did, should make lending
decisions locally. Matsukata wanted the bank to lend money with land
as security; Maeda feared this would deepen the rural depression of the
1880s. Matsukata planned to lend for large-scale, government-
sponsored projects at the prefectural and county level; Maeda's primary
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loan recipients would be g n , that is, prosperous farmers, and local
village and town-level, small-scale entrepreneurs to stimulate
productivity and exports in products such as raw silk, tea, and sugar.
Maeda was a transcendentalist who opposed political parties until the
end of his life, but at the same time he had a firm commitment to the
importance of local decision making by farmers and rural entrepreneurs.
This latter belief had a strong influence on Takahashi.16
Although Maeda and Takahashi had many supporters for their
developmental proposal, they faced a number of obstacles and finally
met crushing defeat in 1884-5. (Those scholars who emphasize the
importance of  Maeda as an industrial planner, must remember that he
was a failed industrial planner.) The Finance Ministry, driven by
Matsukata’s frugality and commitment to the development of heavy
transplant industry, pressured for the recall of all of the copies of the
‘Interim Report’ in the fall of 1884 and forced its complete revision, so
that when the final version, the  30-volume K gy  iken, was published in
December 1884, its teeth had been pulled. It was more of a survey of
existing conditions than a proposal for future policy. In fact, Matsukata
was so successful in suppressing the ‘Interim Report’ that scholars did
not know of its existence until 1969, when Ariizumi Sadao, an
archivist/historian working on the Maeda papers at the National Diet
Library, published a seminal article comparing the two versions. The
sanji-in, the principal deliberative organ of government before the
establishment of the cabinet system in late 1885, debated the conflicting
proposals for an industrial bank throughout much of that year, but  could
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not reach a conclusion. Finally, to end the debate, Matsukata withdrew
the Finance Ministry’s proposal, effectively killing the chances for any
industrial bank in 1885. (This did not happen until 1897.) Within months,
most of Maeda’s staff were sacked, Takahashi was sent to Europe to
study patent and copyright laws, and Maeda, as Mikuriya Takashi tells
us, was made the scapegoat and furloughed - that is, he received a
salary, but had no duties. Although Maeda returned briefly to the
Agriculture and Commerce Ministry in 1888-90, his career as an
important public official ended with the defeat of his K gy  iken plan in
1885. Maeda spent most of his life until his death in 1921 deeply
embittered. Only Takahashi of all the members of Maeda’s group went
on to have a significant career in the civil service.17
Yet Maeda’s ideas lived on, at least partly because of their influence on
Takahashi, in a number of ways. Throughout his career, Takahashi
questioned the efficacy of army and navy involvement in the formulation
of foreign policy and of excessive military spending: in 1912-13 he
fought the army’s plan for two new divisions, in 1915 he opposed the
kuma government’s Twenty-One Demands to China, in 1920 he called
for the abolition of the army and navy general staffs, in 1921-22 his
cabinet negotiated limits on naval armaments at the Washington
Conference, and in the later 1920s, he opposed his own Seiy kai party’s
support for aggressive adventurism in China. In the early 1930s, he was
one of the few party politicians to publicly confront the demagogic army
minister, Araki Sadao, and he repeatedly told the army and navy that
defense spending that went beyond Japan’s fiscal capacity created only
16
an illusion of security. While serving as finance minister in the Hara
Cabinet and then as prime minister in 1918-1922, Takahashi tried to
decentralize power over and decisionmaking about education, public
works and health by transferring their administration and control of the
land tax to localities, that is, to levels of government closer to the users.
His effort failed when Matsukata, still committed to top-down
government at the end of his life, refused to allow the devolution of the
land tax, one of the achievements of his youth.18 And finally, Takahashi
was following in Maeda’s footsteps when he ended rural relief efforts
and advocated rural self-help in 1935.
Economic historians have advanced several explanations for
Takahashi’s decision to end rural relief efforts after fiscal year 1934. The
most far-fetched is that Takahashi as a representative of the finance
capitalist class was simply following his class instincts  and had no
sympathy for the plight of the rural poor. But on reading Takahashi’s
speeches, interviews, and articles from this period, one finds many
assertions of support for the countryside. A few scholars, and
particularly one of Takahashi’s early biographers, Imamura Takeo, have
argued only a little more plausibly, that the ageing Takahashi was a
‘robot’ of fiscally conservative finance ministry subordinates, who had
opposed his spending policies from 1932 and finally forced him to
undertake retrenchment in 1935. But there are weaknesses with this
argument too. Takahashi emphasized and reemphasized between 1932
and 1935 that his stimulative, countercyclical policies were temporary,
and that once the economy had recovered from the depression (which it
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had by 1935), he would bring government spending back into balance
with income and lessen the government’s role in the economy.
Moreover, the primary sources for the ‘robot’ view are the postwar
reminiscences of a few of Takahashi's prewar finance ministry
subordinates. Some of these accounts have the unpleasant aroma of
wartime officials reinventing themselves after the war. Kaya Okinori, for
example, who identified himself as one of the fiscal conservatives who
manipulated Takahashi, served as prime minister Konoe Fumimaro's
finance minister when Japan invaded China in the summer of 1937. Not
only did he give the military in 1937 and 1938 appropriations far larger
than Takahashi had ever dreamed of, but he also supported Japan's
war of aggression on the mainland and cooperated closely with General
Ishiwara Kanji in planning a total war economic structure, that is, a
wartime command economy that ignored market information
altogether.19
Still other historians have argued, more persuasively, that Takahashi
saw the necessity of eliminating Japan's budget deficit in the mid-1930s
and pared where he could. Since army and navy opposition made
cutting military spending politically difficult, especially in an era when
young officers were assassinating officials and businessmen, Takahashi
could eliminate relief expenditures more easily than he could military
spending.20 Takahashi, who almost uniquely among officials and
politicians courageously opposed increases in military spending in the
mid-1930s, is a case in point - young army officers brutally murdered
him in 1936. And I should add here, Takahashi understood the risks
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when he confronted the army. When Takahashi undertook retrenchment
in the final year-and-one-half of his life, he told an acquaintance, ‘If I
were younger and could serve the emperor in the future, I would worry
about the (young officers), but at my age I have no future. I have to do
my service now. I entered the government again (in November 1934)
thinking that this is my last chance to serve. I am prepared to die now’.21
But it is another reason, Takahashi's belief that efforts at rural recovery
engineered by central bureaucrats would not succeed - that success
depended on a knowledge of local conditions, crops, and markets,
which varied from region to region - which I think is most important. As
Takahashi wrote at the time, ‘because each farmer and the situation in
each farm village differs, it would be wrong to impose a comprehensive
relief program’.22  ‘Each region has its unique disease. We must begin by
investigating these sicknesses and applying the correct cures. If we
scatter money uniformly from the centre to the regions, we cannot
eliminate the diseases’.23 Since national officials could not understand
what was needed at the grassroots level, Takahashi believed, the
government should increase the authority of regional organizations and
officials, strengthen their fiscal power, give them the resources to make
low-interest loans, and then rely on them to help farmers and local
industry. Takahashi learned from Maeda and his 1884-5 proposal for
prefectural banks that the government could best stimulate regional
economic growth by allowing local entrepreneurs and officials to make
decisions about which crops to grow, which goods to produce, and how
to allocate their resources, based on their own reading of local, national,
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and even international market conditions - in other words, based on
‘fundamentals’. Accordingly, after rural Japan began to recover from the
worst of the depression in 1934-35, Takahashi returned to an advocacy
of rural economic development through decentralized decision-making
and attentiveness to grassroots market information.24
Historians have been critical of Takahashi because the rural
rehabilitation movement of the 1930s, of which he was a prime mover,
supported owner-tenant farmers, owner-farmers and small-scale
landlords rather than the hardcore rural poor, and because its structure
of village-level organs became one of the pillars of Japanese fascism in
the wartime years.25 To me, neither criticism of Takahashi is fair. Maeda
recognized, quite progressively for the 1880s, that this rural middle-
class, not the larger landlords who dominated village life in the mid-Meiji
period, was the key to rural economic development, and by the time
Takahashi advocated rural self-help in the 1930s  these people had
replaced the richer  landlords as the political and economic leaders of
their villages. By urging a policy that relied on these yeoman farmers,
Takahashi recognized the realities of village life. One cannot blame
Takahashi because the rural rehabilitation movement, based originally
on his commitment to Maeda's concept of development from below,
became a bureaucratically controlled, authoritarian movement after his
death. He was, after all, as several Japanese writers have emphasized,
‘the last barrier to militarism’.26
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Conclusion: Takahashi’s self-help ideas did not develop from a finance  
capitalist mentality or a bureaucratic way of thinking or because he was
a robot of his subordinates or only from his need to cut government
spending in 1934-36. Takahashi had a theoretical commitment to
decentralized decisionmaking, to a reliance on market forces, one which
he developed under the influence of Maeda Masana in the 1880s. This
is the key to understanding his decision to cut rural relief spending and
advocate rural self-help after Japan began to recover from the depths of
the depression in 1935. This, together with his views that government
must use monetary and fiscal policy both to grow and to stabilize the
economy, that economic growth should benefit all Japanese, not just
state power and the zaibatsu elite, and that military spending should be
kept within affordable limits, were legacies of his Meiji period education
as a policy apprentice.
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Analysing the Relationship between Business and Politics
in Pre-War Japan: Some Thoughts on the Zaikai1
Masataka Matsuura
How should we analyse the relationship between business and politics?
This may be a classic and universal issue for the social sciences. There are
many possible ways to proceed, for example, by using the idea of class, or
the idea of the ‘power elite’ introduced by C Wright Mills, or in Japan the
notion of zaibatsu, as in the Mitsui or Sumitomo zaibatsu. Today, however,
I would like to suggest the usefulness of the idea of zaikai (literally financial
world) to describe the relationship between business and politics in Japan.
There are three questions which I want to deal with. The first is, what is
zaikai? I use the word both in an original way and from a historial
perspective. I want to explain why I use the word, and how it is different
from zaibatsu. For those of you who may not know, zaibatsu is found these
days in the OED (second edition) and the definition reads: ‘In Japan, a
large capitalist organisation, usually based on a single family having
controlling interests in a variety of companies, of a type that existed before
the war of 1939-45; since 1947, a cartel or conglomerate. Also, the
member of such an enterprise.’ The second question I want to address is,
is the zaibatsu a phenomenon unique to Japan? On this point I would like
to hear some suggestions about Britain or other countries from you
afterwards. The third question I want to address today is, how was the
zaibatsu formed and what was it like?
Let us start with the first question, what is meant by zaikai? Zaikai means a
very narrow business circle of the elité connected to political power. The
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meaning of zaikai changed over time. Before 1945 zaikai covered a very
wide range of meanings. It was used to mean not only an industrial or
business circle but sometimes even more broadly, to refer to the whole
economy. When the Second World War ended, however, it came to refer
specifically to a narrow business élite connected to political power.
Japanese people have come to realise the existence of connections
between political power and business, and have generally seen this in
zaibatsu. However, in my opinion, this is not zaibatsu but zaikai, which
began to grow after the Russo-Japanese War and became firmly
established around the First World War. Since 1945, zaikai has changed to
mean only gatherings of business pressure groups, because the strong
power core group which developed after the First World War perished after
the Second World War. Today I would like to define as zaikai the core
group in the business society which lasted between the two World Wars.
For a long time zaibatsu has been taken as the key concept for analysing
the relationship between politics and the economy in Japan. People
believed that there was an ‘inappropriate relationship’ between zaibatsu
and political parties and government in pre-war Japan. At this time there
was a two-party system, based on the Seiy kai party, and the Kenseikai
party, which later became the Minseit . It is often said, even now, that the
Mitsui zaibatsu controlled the Seiy kai and the Mitsubishi zaibatsu
controlled the Kenseikai, and that they took turns dominating politics. The
most often cited individual examples of this are the Prime Minister Kat
Takakakira (1924-26), who was the leader of Kenseikai, and his Foreign
Minister Shidehara Kij r  (1924-27, 29-31), who later became prime
minister 1945-46. Both their wives were daughters of Iwasaki Yatar , who
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founded the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. It is true that the zaibatsu supplied human
resources and funds to the parties, but such an image of politics is too
simplified. In the past, explanations have stressed the economic power of
the zaibatsu and infer from this that they must also have controlled politics.
It is true that zaibatsu had real structural power and that ordinary people
were in awe of it. This, however, ignores the question of actual political
processes and the flow of political history. In fact, most big zaibatsu
forbade their members to have any connection with politics. They gave
parties donations for campaign funds, but in most cases, direct political
reward in return was unnecessary. So then, is zaikai different from
zaibatsu? My answer is, yes, totally different. Zaibatsu is a very important
factor in explaining the zaikai, but the former is not the same thing as the
latter. So, how does zaikai differ from zaibatsu?
Firstly, the zaikai is a political variable with which we can analyse the
relationship between the business world and politics. Zaibatsu is only an
economic variable and as such cannot be used to explain the process of
politics. Secondly, the zaikai maintained political connections with ‘the
state’, political parties and politicians for the express purpose of influencing
politics. However, in most cases it remained invisible to ordinary people. It
had neither formal nor legal existence. So, most people imagined that the
visible zaibatsu had all the political power that the business world was
capable of possessing. However, this was not the case. Thirdly, the zaikai
was a limited network of the business elite, most of whom can be called
zaikai sewagy , which might be translated into English as ‘economic
system facilitator (or coordinator)’. This is very important. The zaikai was a
network of zaikai sewagy  who tried to maintain the economic system and
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to reform it through their efforts. Sewagy means the business of providing
sewa (help, assistance) and sewa is the key concept in explaining the
nature of the zaikai, one that may be unique to Japanese society. Thus the
true difference is in my opinion, that the zaikai was composed of zaikai
 , but in most cases leader of zaibatsu were not 	
	  .
For example, from my perspective, Dan Takuma, who was famous leader
of the Mitsui zaibatsu, was not a 	
	  , and maintained a firm
	
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who bitterly attacked 	
	   members, defended him. Dan was
respected in the business world, not because he was 	
	 , but
because he was an excellent leader of the big Mitsui zaibatsu. He never
participated in the 	
	  network.
Now, let us move on to the second problem, namely is such a zaikai unique
to Japan? It is often said that the zaikai is a very special style of political
power wielded by elite business circles particular to Japan, that the zaikai is
unique to Japanese society, and that the word zaikai cannot be translated
accurately into other languages. I am not familiar with the power style of
business elites in other countries, but my feeling is that phenomena such
as the zaikai may be rather common in many countries, although each
country may have its own particular style whereby the business world
influences political power, and every society is unique.
The zaikai in Japan mirrors three aspects of Japanese society. Firstly,
there is the cultural aspect. Zaikai meetings were often held in a private
room in a kind of high-class restaurant, known as a  	. The private room
could hold up to around ten people. Its limited space is important. The
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meetings were mostly held in these  	, but sometimes at a private
mansion. Zaikai meetings were mostly dinners folowed by a speech and
discussion, but sometimes they took the form of a tea ceremony.
Occasionally they might be organised around a private antique exhibition.
Both the tea ceremony and antique collecting are customs which require
participants to be wealthy, and can be closely identified with the Japanese
cultural background. Perhaps the British business elite use tea, fish and
chips and chocolate bars at the famous ‘gentleman’s club’ for the same
purpose!
Secondly, the zaikai was based on the way that people relate to each
other, termed in Japanese sewa. It is difficult to explain the implications of
sewa. It means firstly care, help, assistance, aid, and charity; and secondly,
good offices, recommendation. A 	
	   would have many
different roles as an intermediary, mediator, agent, caretaker, manager,
and producer, in the Japanese economic system or Japanese capitalism.
Thirdly, the particular process of economic and political development in
Japan was an important factor in shaping the zaikai. I would not wish to say
that there is only a single-tracked path of development, but rather that
Japan sought to follow the path of the West and tried to catch up with it.
The Meiji government could build concrete infrastructure and import
machines and engineers, but did not have the resources to create
intangible systems like the networks needed to run and maintain a
business society. This will become clearer when we examine the role
played by the individual 	
	 .
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Who, then, were the 	
	  ? From here we shall deal with the
third main problem, that is, how did the zaikai start and what forms did it
take? The first individual to be known for   was Shibusawa Eiichi
(1840-1931), who was the son of a rich farmer and became a samurai
retainer of the Tokugawa Shogunate. After the Meiji Restoration he was
employed by the new government. When he was a farmer, Shibusawa had
once tried to be an anti-Western terrorist and to set fire to Western people’s
accommodation in Yokohama to kill all the Western people there. However,
after that he was employed by the Tokugawa Shogunate and was sent to
an international exhibition in Paris as an attendant of the Shogun’s brother.
He learnt about the Western economic system for a year in Europe and
then returned to Japan, where he worked to set up the new economic
system in Meiji Japan. He played an important role in introducing such new
ideas as the company, the bank, insurance, and so on. It is not difficult to
imagine how hard and how important it was to introduce such brand new
ideas to traditional Japan. Shibusawa not only encouraged private
merchants and rich people to create and invest in new companies and
banks, but he himself also put his money into such new enterprises.
After working as a bureaucrat to  establish a new system of currency and
finance, Shibusawa resigned because of a political conflict and became a
private entrepreneur. During his life he established five hundred companies
and banks, and also many business associations such as the Japan
Chamber of Commerce, the Bank Assembly (	
  
	), the Tokyo
Stock Exchange, and the Tokyo Commercial Inquiry Agency (Tokyo
 	). When the first economic crisis struck Japanese capitalism in
1890, and during similar crises after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95
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and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, Shibusawa acted as a mediator
between the government, the Bank of Japan and other business interests
in order to find a way of protecting the economic system. He was also
involved in mediating various types of conflicts in companies, like labour
disputes, internal troubles with executives, takeovers, mergers, and bad
debts, and helping reorganise and restructure them. This kind of mediation
activity was one of the main task of the 	
	  , because the
Japanese economic system was immature, anxious to catch up with
Western countries, and the Japanese state did not have the power to
mediate in the private business world. At first Shibusawa worked as an
architect on the Japanese economic system, presenting a blueprint and
setting up the system, but later he worked as one of the original zaikai
 , maintaining and coordinating that system. He wielded political
power as a representative of both the banking sector and the industrial
sector in the first stage of the development of modern Japan. This double
role was possible because Japanese industry was underdeveloped.
Shibusawa prepared for retirement around the time of the First World War,
and he worked with and nurtured the second generation of 	
	 .
This second group is represented by Wada Toyoji, Inoue Junnosuke, and
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then went to America to do business for six years. After that he worked with

(	 			*		

+			*	
in 1901. There he restructured the company and made his name as a good
manager. From then on, that is, after the Russo-Japanese War, he started
to work as a zaikai  , because other businessmen brought many
management and business problems to him. It was after the First World
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War that his activities became prominent, because at this time a sustained
recession occurred; many companies faced management crises and the
government established many economic councils to try and address the
problems. Wada reorganised many companies, worked as a committee
member on many governmental councils, and took the initiative in
establishing new business associations.
Inoue Junnosuke (1869-1932) was the son of a poor sake brewer, but
managed to enter the Bank of Japan. There, owing to some luck and his
own efforts, he eventually became the first president of the bank who had
worked there his whole career. During the depression after the First World
War and as president of the bank, he made available a lot of funds to save
other banks and companies. Before Inoue’s presidency the bank had
followed a retrenchment policy, but he changed this policy, to give the Bank
of Japan the means to supply funds not only for commercial finance but
also directly to industries. Assisting the business community in this way,
Inoue acquired a strong influence over banks and industries, to the extent
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Inoue was the president of the Bank of Japan, he had an inappropriate
relationship with at least one private businessman, to whom he gave
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England  and the Federal Reserve (in the US) were required to remain
aloof from the private business world. He therefore attacked Inoue on the
grounds that the president of the Bank of Japan should not be involved with
private businessmen, and should not act as a zaikai member.
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Inoue later became Finance Minister of the Yamamoto Cabinet in
September 1923, but he resigned along with the cabinet three months later
and became fully involved in the business of 	
	  . Every day
thirty or forty clients would visit him to consult him about business or
management matters, and he assisted in a lot of big company mergers,
amalgamations and reorganisations. When the Financial Crisis occurred in
1927, he again became president of the Bank of Japan under the Tanaka
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settle the economic crisis. He consulted with the big five banks,
reorganised many weak banks and established a 'bridge bank’, called the
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the finanical system in fact became a model for the contemporary ‘bridge
banks’ used today. Inoue stressed the importance of cooperation between
banks, of the stability of the financial system, warned against excessive
competition, and supported the existence of an interest rate agreement
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intervening in bank finances and this became a major reason for his
eventual resignation. After that he became a party politician, joining the
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return to the gold standard.
G• Seinosuke (1865-1942) started his zaikai sewagy• career around 1895,
with his reputation based on his success in restructuring a transportation
company. He became the top zaikai sewagy• when Inoue was
assassinated in 1932. He was the son of Japan’s first Deputy Minister of
Finance, but he was disowned because of  his exceedingly evil deeds in his
boyhood, and was sent to Heidelberg to study for his doctorate. After
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obtaining his degree he returned to Japan and started a business. It was
during his presidency of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (1911-24) that he
gained a reputation as a zaikai sewagy•. He made efforts to correct the
public evaluation of stock markets, changing investment through this
means from a form of gambling to an essential component of capitalism.
After the First World War G  used his political power and connections to
the bureaucracy  and politicians to defend the market against widespread
panic. A member of his staff, Kawai Yoshinari, suggested a plan for
stabilizing the market by cooperation between a syndicate of banks and the
Bank of Japan. This scheme has been used several times since the
Second World War, notably in the Yamaichi crisis in 1965 and also in the
current economic crisis. G  also achieved some successful results as a
zaikai sewagy , including reorganization, mergers and mediating with other
zaikai sewagy . Important cases in which he was involved included the
merger of the Nihon Y sen (Japan Mail Steamship Company) and Toy
Kisen (Oriental Steamship Company) in 1926, the establishment of the
Electric Power Union (Denrykoku Renmei) and the control over the supply
of electricity in 1932, and the big merger of steel makers into Nihon
Seitetsu (Japan Steel) in 1934.
Shibusawa and the second generation of zaikai sewagy , Wada, Inoue and
G , had many points in common. Firstly, they had considerable financial
assets, connections with the big zaibatsu, and access to financial
institutions such as the Bank of Japan and the Japan Industrial Bank. Pre-
war Japan was an economically more unequal society than it is now, and
business was based more on the responsibility of the individual. If a
company went bankrupt, executives had to give up their private assets to
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cover its debts. In these circumstances, zaikai sewagy  who had
information on things such as funds, human resources, and business
opportunities, as well as connections to zaibatsu, bureaucracy and
politicians, were needed to settle economic crises and mangement crises
within companies. However, none of these men was a member of a
zaibatsu, and they were proud of that fact. Inoue praised Shibusawa as a
force for checking the power of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi zaibatsu, and he
himself tried to do the same. Also, all of these zaikai sewagy  had
knowledge of the society and economic systems of the West. All of them
had experience of study or work in Europe or America, and this was a rare
thing in pre-war Japan. Japan felt she had to catch up with Western
countries, so information about Western societies was needed. Finally,
these men were all committed to the idea of sewa, that is, providing care or
service for other people. They worked for their clients and it was through
this means that they acquired their reputation and networks. Except for
Inoue, who switched into politics, all had their own networks of people who
respected and worked for them. Shibusawa had the Ry mon kai, Wada
had the Kamome kai, and G  had the Banch  kai.
In the 1930s G  was joined by Ikeda Shigeaki (1867-1950) and Y ki
Toyotar  (1877-1951) to form the third wave of zaikai sewagy . Ikeda was
the son of a middle-ranking samurai in Yonezawa and graduated from
Harvard University. After returning to Japan he joined the Mitsui Bank, and
from 1904 he worked as the key manager of the bank. As a key person in
the Mitsui Bank, he promoted cooperation between private banks. Initially,
the area of bank finance was competitive and free from state intervention,
but after the First World War the competition for bank accounts became
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very intense because of the expansion of the economy. Ikeda took the
initiative in seeking to regulate interest rates for private banks with the help
of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. Other bankers had
previously reached similar agreements, but Ikeda Shigeaki was the first to
ensure that all parties honoured them. Ikeda was also the president of the
Tokyo Clearing House (Tokyo Tegata K kanjo) from 1923. During the
financial disturbances after the First World War, especially during the
Financial Crisis in 1927, he used his strong leadership to maintain and
strengthen the cooperation between banks. For that reason he acquired
strong influence over banks and in the manufacturing sector. He
established the Industry Research Association (Sangy  Ch sa Ky kai) in
1930 with a view to rationalizing industry and establishing bank syndicates
in order to decide where investment funds should be concentrated. This
was the start of the cooperative investment system which was to continue,
along with the main bank system, after the Second World War. Ikeda was
also able to bring trust banks and insurance companies as well as
commercial banks within the remit of these systems. In this way he was
able to establish influence over these sectors, too.
Y ki Toyotar  graduated from Tokyo Imperial University and then entered
the Bank of Japan. He was sent by the bank to America to study for two
years, and later became a branch manager in Osaka. He subsequently
resigned from the Bank of Japan and became vice president of Yasuda
Bank with a remit to restructure it. In 1930 he was appointed president of
the Japan Industrial Bank by Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke. There he
worked in conjunction with Finance Minister Inoue to advance rescue loans
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to a number of industries. These tremendous loans established his
reputation as zaikai sewagy .
Inoue stopped working as zaikai sewagy  to become a politician, but was
assassinated shortly afterwards. It was after this that the third wave, G ,
Ikeda and Y ki, came to the fore as zaikai sewagy . Inoue, Ikeda and Y ki
were bankers, and Inoue and Y ki were also involved in the finances of the
nation. This mirrors the importance of bankers and the national finances
after the First World War and especially in the 1930s.
Finally then, how was the zaikai organised into a formal network of zaikai
sewagy ? Before the First World War Shibusawa was able to cover all the
sectors and areas of the economy as a zaikai sewagy , but after the war,
such work became impossible. With the war, industry had developed
tremendously, and in 1917 the Nihon K gy  Kurabu (the Japan Industry
Club) was established as a gentleman’s club for large industry. It is often
said that this club was ruled by the zaibatsu, because its presidents and the
chairman of the board of directors, like Dan Takuma, were from the
zaibatsu. In fact, however, the real power was held by Wada, G  and their
colleagues, who worked as managing directors. As for the banking sector,
it was Ikeda and Inoue who had influence over it. At that time the Japanese
business world was comprised of three ‘islands’: the banking sector, the
industrial manufacturing sector, and the small and medium-scale
enterprises sector. The last of these three was represented by the
Chamber of Commerce, which was controlled mainly by Fujiyama Raita.
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In 1917 a very important club was established in the form of the Y ka-kai
(the Eighth Club), so known because its meetings were held on the 8th day
of every month. The club’s membership was limited to only 10 people, and
these included G , Inoue, Wada, Ikeda, Fujiyama and a few others from
banks and industries. This club appears to have lasted for 28 years, until
the end of the Second World War, and meetings were held continuously
throughout this time! Because of the people involved, and the length of time
over which the club continued to operate, a formidable power was
maintained. Every meeting had only one guest, who was usually an
important politician, and the group would then discuss the important topics
of the day. The club embraced representatives of the three sectors
mentioned above, and it was here that important mission were born, like
the Business Mission to Europe and America in 1921-22, and important
institutions like the Nihon Keizai Renmeikai (the Japan Business League),
which was established by the three sectors in 1922.
The organisation and unification of the zaikai was completed when G  was
elected president of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce in 1930 and
president of the Japan Business League in 1932. The zaikai sewagy   had
constructed networks through their sewagy  business, and these formal
institutions were the result. With the completion of such organisations they
started a political campaign for industrial rationalization and economic
control based on self regulation. This marked an institutionalization of the
sewagy  business, that is, mergers and rationalization with the help of the
state. They often took as their models H C Hoover in America, and W
Rathenau and W V M llendorff in Germany. This may be considered as
their brand of ‘progressivism’, modelled on that of America. The group
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managed to have Nakajima Kumakichi, who was an associate of G ,
appointed to the Sait  cabinet as the Minister of Commerce and Industry in
1932, and brought about the unification of the steel industry by establishing
Japan Steel in 1934. Nakajima also tried to mediate a union between the
political parties to check the power of the military. At this point, their
opponent Mut  Sanji, who believed in a liberal economy, took the view that
the zaikai was a conspiracy against sound politics and economics. He
started an anti-zaikai campaign in the newspaper he owned, and bitterly
attacked G 2 Banch kai for many things, including bribery. The
Prosecutor’s Office, which was then very politicized, sympathized with
Mut ’s bribery allagations and prosecuted many innocent businessmen,
such as Nakajima, as well as bureaucrats. This is the famous ‘Teijin
Scandal’ which brought about the fall of the Sait  cabinet.
Even after that, the members of the zaikai continued to try and realise their
ideas. In order to do so Y ki became the president of the Bank of Japan
and Ikeda served as the Minister of Finance. These roles were later
reversed. They insisted on economic cooperation with China to check the
military and try to avoid war with China. After the Sino-Japanese War broke
out, they tried to cooperate with Britain to stop the war and to reorganise
the economy of Shanghai as a centre for internationa business. As for
strengthening the war economy, they tried to achieve this through self
regulation.2
However, as the war continued and the bureaucratic influence became
stronger, the zaikai network was thought to be unnecessary, and the state
bureaucracy and the military decided to control industry directly. Therefore,
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although some schemes and a few successors, like Kobayashi Ataru and
Nakayama Sohei, did survive, the zaikai perished with the Second World
War. Today the word zaikai still exists, but its influence and power has
largely diminished. In this sense, my wife keeps telling me, it is not unlike
men in contemporary Japan.
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Endnotes
1. This paper draws on a number of my earlier works. Any interested
reader who wishes to refer in more detail to the issues and individuals
discussed here should refer to one or more of the following:
 i. ‘Nitch  Sens  Sh sh  K s  to Kach  Ts ka K saku’ (Visions of the
Settlement of the Sino-Japanese War, and the Currency Question in
Central China), Kokusai Seiji, vol.97 (May 1991)
 ii. Nitch  Sens  Ki ni okeru Keizai to Seiji (Economics and Politics during
the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945) (Tokyo University Press, 1995)
 iii. ‘Teijin Jiken K ’ (A Study of the Teijin Scandal), in Nihon Seiji Gakkai
(ed.), Nenp  Seijigaku 1995 (Iwanami Shoten, 1995)
 iv. ‘”Zaikai Sewagy ” to Keizai Shisutemu no Kiki’ (“Zaikai sewagy ” and
the Crisis of the Economic System) in Tamura Toshiyuki (ed.),
Hokudai H gakubu Raiburarii 3: J h  Chitsujo, Nettowaaku (Hokkaido
University Press, 1999)
 v. ‘Saik  Nitch  Sens  Zenya – Ch goku Heisei Kaikaku to Kodama
H ch dan o Megutte’ (Rethinking the Eve of the Sino-Japanese War –
On Chinese Currency Reform and the Kodama Mission to China),
Kokusai Seiji, vol.122 (September 1999)
 vi. ‘Takahashi Korekiyo to ‘Ky koku Itchi’ Naikaku – Seit  Naikaku
H kaigo no Seiji Keizai’ (Takahashi Korekiyo and the ‘National Unity’
Cabinet – Political Economy after the Breakdown of the Party System)
in Kitaoka Shinichi & Mikuriya Takashi (eds.), Title to be confirmed
(forthcoming, Tokyo University Press)
2. I will be discussing some of these issues at another workshop at LSE.
